NEWS AND VIEWS
Australia

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Wednesday, 11 April 2007

Dysfunctional Defence

The black tie the Prime Minister wore yesterday to announce that Australia will be sending troops to actually shoot their guns in Afghanistan may well reflect a sense of foreboding about giving an increased task to a military when a government report released last week claimed "the current range and nature of military operations is causing stress in Defence, and excessive pressures on senior people." The damning report released late on the eve of the Easter holidays, and thus barely reported so far in the press, certainly warned John Howard that all is far from well in the Department of Defence which was described as an organisation which "has confused its accountabilities."

The Labor Shadow Defence Minister Joel Fitzgibbon was not exaggerating in describing the report of the Defence Management Review as highlighting "the dysfunctional relations between the Minister, his staff and defence planners and managers." Behind the restrained language to be expected in a report to government, commissioned by government, is a story of a department with so much money to spend "there is now less concern about efficiency than in the past. Management information is inadequate, and many of the processes we would have expected to find to support such a large, complex organisation (information technology and human resources) are also deficient and in some cases not aligned with the desired future direction of Defence."

The report reveals the breakdown of relations between the Defence ministers and the public servants and military officers supposed to be serving them. It said:

The perception is that Defence performance in quality, reliability and timeliness of advice remains poor despite having many of the better practice processes in place. In examining the issue, we concluded that the factors behind this were:

. The lack of common understanding between ministers' offices and Defence can mean that expectations are not always met.

. The size, complexity and hierarchical nature of Defence can delay responses.

. A culture in Defence which emphasises due process over timely responses.

. Lines of communication to the Minister and his office are limited to very few people (the Secretary and CDF, for example) and not many others.

The Review committee gave some examples of the evidence it received to illustrate these points.

"Defence management will continue to be a problem for successive Defence Ministers until they develop a climate of partnership founded on trust and mutual respect."

"I believe that at times Defence sees the Government as an 'obstacle'."

"The information flow can be frustrating. The Minister's saying "I am informed that." but other things tend to turn up later. Abu Ghraib was one instance of this."

"Only a change of culture will prevent problems recurring."

"There is a significant lack of responsibility and accountability in Defence. I have observed over a long period of time that people in Defence insist on having processes set out for them so as to escape accountability-this is a systemic problem."

"There is evidence of corporate fragmentation- groups doing their own thing and getting away with it; behaving as owners rather than tenants; looking after their own interests with no regard to cost or the difficulties they cause other Defence stakeholders or the portfolio as a whole."

"As a general problem across the organisation, people just don't take accountability."

A Contract to Say Farewell With

Andrew Peacock, the former Liberal Party Parliamentary Leader, Foreign Minister and Australian Ambassador to Washington, retired back in February from his position as President of Boeing Australia. In early March the Minister for Defence, Dr Brendan Nelson, made the surprise announcement of a decision to spend $6 billion with Boeing on a batch of Super Hornet fighter aircraft for the Australian air force.

That Boeing should win a major contract is not surprising. The American company, after all, is the world's leading aeroplane manufacture and a substantial supplier of defence equipment to countries around the world. What has made this acquisition different, and the recent connection of Mr Peacock to Boeing potentially embarrassing for the government, is the direct involvement of Dr Nelson in making it. For the purchase of the Super Hornets is not the result of some orthodox procurement policy where teams of military and public service officers spend months, or even years, weighing up the alternative options. This purchase was very much the minister's own decision.

Dr Nelson made it to avoid the risk of the air force being caught short between the phasing out of the F111s planned for 2010 and the arrival of the Joint Strike Fighter aircraft which Australia is all but committed to buying from the United States when it is finally built. Since the announcement that 24 Super Hornets will be the insurance policy against JSF delays, air force experts have been bobbing up everywhere criticising the purchase on the grounds that it is not capable of doing the required job.

Dr Nelson would be wise to quickly make it known that he had absolutely no discussions with Mr Peacock about the purchase.